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Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory
Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving
Younger
Philip P. Frickeyt
To my children, eleven minutes are an eternity. To their
middle-aged father, eleven years are an evanescence. Eleven
years ago I lost my colleague, Irving Younger, after a valiant
fight with cancer. Irving was only fifty-five at his death-almost eleven years older than I am now, when I am honored to
become the Irving Younger Professor of Law.
Irving had filled the three decades in the law that fate allowed him by living life in the law to the fullest: he had been a
private practitioner, a federal prosecutor, and a state court
trial judge, as well as a law professor. He taught at the University of Minnesota Law School from 1984 to about a week before his death in March 1988. It is extraordinary how in this
brief period he so engaged our students. Our mutual students
waxed poetic to me-and these are young adults from the upper Midwest, mind you-about their sense of awe and deep appreciation for the magic that he conjured up and made into law
every day, just for them. For him, law-his law, anyway-was
performance art, even though our catalog just called it "Evidence" and "Civil Procedure." In the final few classes he
taught, he broke all personal pedagogical precedents, abandoning the animated, erect posture that was his signature and
remaining seated while speaking. He apologized to the students by saying simply that he was unable to do it any other
way. After he passed away, his presence lived on in those students, who wanted to commemorate for future generations

t Irving Younger Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. This essay
is a slightly revised and lightly footnoted version of a lecture given on March
3, 1999 to inaugurate the Irving Younger Professorship at the University of
Minnesota Law School. I appreciate the indulgence of the Minnesota Law Review in publishing the lecture largely as I gave it and in waiving the usual requirement of copious footnoting of all propositions.
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their sense of the man and his legacy. In the lobby of our law
school is a memorial plaque and display honoring Irving.
As Jon Waltz has written, "[albove all, [Irving] was a consummate teacher of both the experienced and the inexperienced."' Long before his untimely demise, Irving had established himself as the foremost lecturer on advocacy, evidence,
and trial practice in the United States. Louise Weinberg, a
long-time friend, summed up the "public Irving" by writing that
"his real mdtier was the lecture-hall. Dickens's American
tours, Dickens's amazing lectures, were deep in his consciousness; and here was something he could do so superbly he could
satisfy even himself."2 Unlike Dickens, Irving lived in the age
of videotape. The man is gone, but his lectures on such topics
as what really happened in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins3 live
on in dozens of law libraries. In a very real sense, his legacy
reflects his public persona-it is magnetic.
Seven years ago I delivered a lecture inaugurating the
Faegre & Benson professorship, which I was pleased to be
awarded at that time. Entitled From the Big Sleep to the Big
Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation,it was
later published as an essay by the Minnesota Law Review. 4 In
thinking about Irving for this lecture, I recalled how I prepared
that lecture as a lecture, and then later modified it for publication. The best way to inaugurate a chair honoring Irving, I
think, is with a real lecture-not something written as an essay, read in serious style, and later printed verbatim in a law
review. That was not Irving's style, nor should it be the style of
a lecturer-one who respects an audience of persons willing to
part with their precious time to hear commentary. What follows is a lecture in honor of a great lecturer.
In that light, I was reminded of a great lecturer of the last
century who is known today only for the essays derived from
those lectures. Ralph Waldo Emerson knew how to engage an
audience. Consider, for example, the first sentence of one of his
lectures: "There are some subjects which have a kind of prescriptive right to dull treatment."5 The rest of the first para1.
2.
3.
4.

Jon R. Waltz, Irving Younger, 73 MINN. L. REV. 819, 820 (1989).
Louise Weinberg, Irving Younger, 73 MINN. L. REV. 823, 824 (1989).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of

Theory in Statutory Interpretation,77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992).
5. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Politics, in 3 THE EARLY LEcTURES OF RALPH

WALDO EMERSON 238, 238 (Robert E. Spiller & Wallace E. Williams eds.,
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graph of the lecture contends that "[a] sprightly book" on certain subjects "would be presumptuous" because the subjects are
so stuffy that the social institutions associated with them "requireD of all comers sleepy manners, half-shut or whole-shut
eyes, and the rigorous exclusion of all wit."6 Emerson wondered how books on such subjects "found readers among mere
mortals who must sometimes laugh and are liable to the infirmity of sleep."7
Believe it or not, in talking about how some subjects have a
prescriptive right to dull treatment, Emerson was not addressing statutory interpretation. His topic was politics! Obviously, Emerson did not anticipate the Presidency of Bill
Clinton. But had someone asked Emerson how to attribute
meaning to a statute, I have little doubt that he would have
applied his notion of a prescriptive right to dull treatment to
the topic. For Emerson, who had abandoned the clergy to pursue his own brand of philosophy, something like inspired intuition, and definitely nothing like textual interpretation of holy
passages, captured the path by which each person might attain
an original relationship with the universe-a transcendency
beyond the diversity that our senses indicate to the unifying
reality lying beyond.
In fact, for many years the legal community considered
statutory interpretation unworthy even of Emerson's prescriptive right to dull treatment. In 1983, Robert Weisberg observed
that "[tihe general contemporary American view of statutory
interpretation is that there is not a great deal to say about the
subject. As a result, nothing else as important in the law receives so little attention."8 As legal scholarship had all but ignored the question of statutory interpretation from the late
1950s to the early 1980s, the Supreme Court confidently intoned that "the sole task"9 of the judiciary in statutory interpretation is to determine congressional intent.' 0 But both the
silence of the academy and the conventional wisdom of the

1972).
6. Id. at 238-39.
7. Id. at 239.
8. Robert Weisberg, The CalabresianJudicial Artist: Statutes and the
New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213 (1983) (footnote omitted).
9. Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 214 (1984).
10. In fact, though, the thorough practitioner could find cases purporting
to stick with plain statutory textual meaning and other cases that relied upon
the "spirit" or purpose of the statute. See Frickey, supra note 4, at 243.
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bench and bar ignored the deep problems that had long been
revealed with a sole reliance upon legislative intent.' Critics
had quarreled over whether legislative intent even existed-at
the federal level, how can 535 people in Congress have any discernible intent? Moreover, even if legislative intent exists, why
should it control statutory meaning?
Statutory meaning is pushed in at least two directions
other than original legislative intent. First, the words of the
statute may seem to have a clear meaning all by themselves. If
that fails to coincide with evidence of legislative intent, such as
the published legislative history, then which of these is to be
privileged in defining statutory meaning? Second, the context
under examination may provide strong reasons for lawyers to
prefer one statutory meaning to another. One meaning may be
more functional, or more consistent with the broader legal
landscape, or simply more in accord with common sense. If the
interpretation consistent with apparent legislative intent produces a dysfunctional or absurd outcome, must that interpretation be privileged as against these more practical concerns?
In my earlier lecture, I noted that a major refocusing on
the subject was beginning to occur by the mid-1980s. 12 In the
academy, Guido Calabresi's book, A Common Law for the Age of
13
Statutes, published in 1982, was the most prominent example.
Although Calabresi dealt mainly with the problem of outdated
statutes rather than with the methodology of statutory interpretation, he did focus attention on the role of statutes in the
broader legal landscape. The major shift, though, was brought
about by three excellent legal minds who bridged the academy
15
14
and the bench. After Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook,
and Antonin Scalia 16 were appointed to federal appellate judgeships and, in Scalia's case, eventually to the Supreme Court,
their various reconsiderations of the conventional wisdom concerning statutory interpretation opened up a new debate.
In the main, and here I turn to events arising since my lecture seven years ago, Scalia's writings, primarily as a Supreme
Court Justice in his opinions, have had the most long-term im11.
869-73
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See, e.g., Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARv. L. REV. 863,
(1930).
See Frickey, supra note 4, at 244-56.
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
See Frickey, supra note 4, at 250-52.
See id. at 252-54.
See id. at 254-56.
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pact. At this point, some personal and professional confessions
are probably in order. Although I have taken issue with much
of his analysis, I must confess that Scalia has been a godsend
to my career. In the mid-1980s, my colleague Bill Eskridge and
I were preparing a new casebook on legislation, with a primary
focus on statutory interpretation. 17 We had undertaken this
project in large part because, as young Washington lawyers, we
had found that we had not been well prepared by our respective
legal educations for what most attorneys actually do most of
the time: interpret statutes and administrative rules that purport to govern the conduct of their clients in the modern regulatory state. We wanted to create teaching materials to fill what
we perceived to be a serious gap in legal pedagogy. But, being
young and ambitious and rather full of ourselves, we wanted
the materials to be very scholarly as well.
As I have aged in my position, I see now that what satisfies
me is work that combines the scholarly and the pedagogicalthat is to say, work that attempts to address both levels simultaneously, rather than seeing one as the dog wagging the tail of
the other or, worse yet, the tail completely severed from the
dog. This is no simple task. Justice Scalia has made the theoretical aspects of statutory interpretation vivid and relevant to
everyone. A practitioner writing a Supreme Court brief who
ignored Justice Scalia's attacks upon the conventional wisdom
about statutory interpretation did so at her own peril. The
practitioner in the lower federal courts was likely to encounter
a fair number of judges who found Scalia's arguments persuasive, and a greater number who paid heed to them, if only to
avoid being reversed. Practice in state courts has always been
more in accord with Scalia's views. At the same time that the
bench and bar were beginning to respond to Scalia's challenges,
legal scholars recognized that the methodology of statutory interpretation is not only one of the most basic of jurisprudential
questions, it is also one of the most challenging. Finally, it became obvious that law students needed a more comprehensive
overview of statutory interpretation for its own sake, not simply as a skill one might pick up by osmosis through taking
17. The book was published as WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988). We produced a second edition in 1995.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed.
1995). Elizabeth Garrett has joined us in beginning work on a third edition.
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statutory courses such as taxation or bankruptcy. In short,
Justice Scalia helped create a new cottage industry for me, for
which I am eternally grateful.
When I gave the lecture seven years ago, it was clear what
most of the elements of the new debate were. The old conventional wisdom-that legislative intent was the primary, if not
the sole, basis for statutory interpretation-was under siege.
Justice Scalia and his allies argued that legislative intent was
nonexistent and, in any event, simply amounted to an unenacted preference, not enacted law.18 This formalist attack
argued that the only "law" was the law on the books-the text
of the statute. 19 From this perspective, statutory interpretation
should be governed by the ordinary meaning of the statutory
text.
The old conventional wisdom was under attack from an antiformalist strain of legal thought as well. In a 1987 article,
Bill Eskridge contended that, in many circumstances, the
meaning of statutes has evolved over time-that statutory law,
like constitutional law and common law, was inherently dynamic rather than static.20 In 1990, Bill and I made the case
for a pragmatic approach to defining and, in limited circumstances, redefining statutory meaning. 2 1 We argued descriptively-that courts had commonly considered textual meaning,
legislative intent, and functional purposes that could be attributed to the statute, all measured against the concrete contexts
of litigation 22-and normatively as well-that this kind of critical pragmatism was appropriate because it sought to construct
practical answers to concrete problems in light of the relevant
23
textual, institutional, and contextual perspectives.
This tension between formalism-what has been called
antiformalism,
Justice Scalia's "new textualism"24-and
amounting to a critical pragmatism, has matured since my lecture seven years ago. Justice Scalia recently gave us a splen-

18.
19.
20.
U. PA.
21.

See Frickey, supra note 4, at 254-56.
See id.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,135
L. REV. 1479 (1987).
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpreta-

tion as PracticalReasoning,42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).

22. See id. at 345-62.
23. See id. at 362-84.
24. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621,
623 (1990).
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did synopsis of his approach. In the Tanner Lectures he delivered at Princeton University, 25 Scalia criticized the antiformalist perspective as anti-democratic and too inattentive to the
appropriate roles of legislatures and courts. 26 He continued his
attack upon what he considers to be the myth of legislative intent in general and the usage of legislative history in statutory
interpretation in particular.2 7
Justice Scalia's arguments have had some effect upon the
Supreme Court. The Court is less likely to cite legislative history today, 28 and when it does, the citations seem less important to the outcome. The Court pays careful attention to statutory text and is much more likely than in earlier eras
to use
29
dictionaries to assist in constructing textual meaning.
Now, it is important not to overstate the practical effects of
the new textualism. As Thomas Merrill has pointed out, in the
opinion-writing process, a Justice who is happy to consult legislative history might decide against using it to keep Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas, who shares Scalia's approach, on
board with the majority result.30 In cases where the votes are
close, we are likely to see this kind of strategic opiniondrafting, especially because Scalia has the habit of refusing to
join any part of a majority opinion that even cites legislative
history. Indeed, he even boycotts portions of majority opinions
that discuss why the legislative history cited by counsel should
31
be given no weight.
25. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The
Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW xii, 3

(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
26. See id. at 9-14.
27. See id. at 16-18.
28. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron
Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355-57 (1994).
29. See Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (1994).
30. See Merrill, supra note 28, at 365.
31. See, e.g., Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523
U.S. 26, 28 n.t (1998) (noting that Justice Scalia joins in the entire opinion
with the exception of a section that discusses and rejects a party's appeal to
legislative history); Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 955
n.t (1997) (noting that Justice Scalia joins in the entire opinion with the exception of a footnote which discusses and rejects the use of legislative history
in construing the statute at issue); Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank
& Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (rejecting the portion of the majority opinion that
discusses the legislative history of the statute at issue).
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Under Justice Scalia's new formalism, while legislative
history is out, the canons of statutory interpretation are back
in. 32 In a dissenting opinion in 1991, he wrote:
I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the
meaning of language in a statute: first, find the ordinary meaning of
the language in its textual context; and second, using established
canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indication that
some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies. 3

Overall, the Rehnquist Court has been aggressive in creating
canons, and Justice
new canons and recasting traditional
34
Scalia has gone along with this trend.
But why? The canons are rules of thumb about statutory
interpretation, and some of them are based on judicially identified policies. For example, statutes waiving sovereign immunity are narrowly construed, and ambiguities in criminal statutes are construed to the advantage of the criminal defendant.
One would think that Justice Scalia would find such canons
anti-democratic, for they are judicially created requirements
that may dislodge an interpretation consistent with ordinary
meaning. And in his Tanner Lectures, Justice Scalia says that
"[to the honest textualist, all of these preferential rules and
presumptions are a lot of trouble," 35 in part because they "in-

32. Respect for the canons had been in decline since Karl Llewellyn's famous essay suggested that for every canon there was a counter-canon. See
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395
(1950). About the time that Scalia lent support to canonical methodology, several scholars were suggesting various theories under which the canons play a
legitimate role in statutory interpretation. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1011 (1989)
(observing that canons may represent "public values" drawn from the Constitution, statutes, and common law); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the
Maxims of Interpretation,1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179, 1183, 1191-225 (discussing
how textual canons may be consistent with philosophical linguistics); David L.
Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation,67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
921, 927-41 (1992) (arguing that canons promote legal stability); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
462-503 (1989) (arguing that canons should provide principles for interpreting
statutes in post-New Deal regulatory circumstances). For a list of the canons
used by the current Supreme Court, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term-Foreword:Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26, 97-108 (1994).
33. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV.
593, 611-29 (1992).
35. Scalia, supra note 25, at 28.
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crease the unpredictability, if not the arbitrariness, of judicial
decisions." 36 As Bill Eskridge has remarked, this skeptical approach to the canons reflected in Justice Scalia's Tanner Lectures is inconsistent both with current Supreme
Court practice
37
and with Scalia's own practice as a Justice.
The tension between Justice Scalia's scholarly quarrels
with the canons and his judicial embrace of them may show
that formalism has tensions buried within it that undermine
the achievement of its goals. The basic premise of formalism is
that predictability and certainty of law and the constraint of
judicial discretion are what make law "law" and separate
courts from legislatures and administrative agencies. If predictability and certainty are desired, one might get there
through Justice Scalia's judicial pronouncement of a method
for statutory interpretation-text plus canons. This is a very
rule-like approach, and perhaps over time, once lower courts
and the practicing bar get more familiar with its nuances, it
could become fairly mechanical and thus predictable. I doubt
it, but it is possible. In any event, note that this is formalism
(top-down rule of law methodology) and not textualism, for
canons can trump ordinary textual meaning. Does Justice
Scalia want to be a textualist, or a text-plus-canons formalist?
He said the former in his lectures and yet has joined, and even
written, Supreme Court opinions that embrace the latter. If
even those who follow such things have difficulty predicting
how he will resolve this tension, it surely undercuts the goals of
his crusade.
More generally, it is not clear that Scalia's effort has had a
beneficial impact upon the practice of statutory interpretation.
On the positive side, it has refocused attention on the text. I
must agree that courts and attorneys were sometimes sloppy in
their handling of ordinary textual meaning before the Scalialed onslaught. It has also helped deflate implausible notions of
legislative intent. But on the negative side, it is open to question whether the new attention to formalism has increased
predictability and certainty. Of course, even if it has, it still
might not be attractive normatively, because it may too easily
ignore considerations of practicality and justice. If the new

36. Id.
37. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96
MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1512 n.9, 1542-47 (1998).
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formalism has not resulted in greater predictability and certainty, however, it has failed on its own terms.
There are reasons to doubt that the new formalism is the
path to a new Jerusalem. A fundamental question is whether
the lower courts have understood what is happening in a way
that helps them conform their decision-making and opinionwriting practices to the new formalism. If the goals of the new
formalism are predictability and certainty of law and limiting
judicial discretion, it can only succeed if the method is comprehended by lower courts and practitioners. There are some startling counterexamples.
38
Perhaps the most vivid is BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.
A provision of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee in bankruptcy to avoid a fraudulent transfer of property made within a
year of the debtor's bankruptcy. 39 For our purposes, let us assume that all the trustee must establish is that the debtor was
insolvent at the time of the transfer and that the debtor received "less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
such transfer."40 The ordinary meaning of this language would
seem to require the bankruptcy court to become a perpetual
real estate appraisal agency. The process could often result in
the invalidation of what were valid transfers of real property
under state law, violating a cardinal principle of AngloAmerican law-the certainty of land title.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in the BFP case saw the problem as a conflict between apparent statutory textual plain meaning, on the one hand, and
common sense on the other, as well as an invasion of the state's
4
local police power to determine the finality of land transfers. '
The court of appeals acknowledged that the lower courts were
divided: some had followed the apparent plain meaning of the
provision and required bankruptcy judges to evaluate the legitimacy of all such property transactions; others had decided
that if the transaction were valid under the state law concern38. 511 U.S. 531 (1994). Other commentators have also subjected this
opinion to withering critique. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Daniel A. Farber,
Beyond the Formalism Debate: Expert Reasoning, Fuzzy Logic, and Complex

Statutes, VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 1999); Eskridge, supra note 37, at
1543-46, 1548, 1550, 1553.
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994).
40. Id. § 548(a)(2)(A).
41. See BFP v. Imperial Sav. & Loan (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144, 1148-49
(9th Cir. 1992), affd sub nom. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531
(1994).
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ing fraudulent conveyances, it should be valid for federal bankruptcy purposes as well. 42 The court of appeals admitted that
"aplain-language interpretation" would require constant bankruptcy court examination of property transactions and noted
that equating state and federal fraudulent conveyance law
might seem to create a judicial exception to the trustee's statutory avoiding powers. 43 The court also admitted that not allowing the trustee to second-guess such transactions might undermine the purpose of this code section, which is to recover
lost equity. 4 The court of'appeals called these arguments "persuasive" and the issue "a close one" but went the other way
based on what it called "broader considerations."45 The court of
appeals was persuaded that, when the trustee interferes with
past transactions, there is a strong possibility of a destabilizing
effect on state mortgage transactions. 4 6 The court of appeals
did not simply speculate on this point: it quoted scholarship
condemning the "plain language" outcome because it arguably
defeated the goals of both state law (because it will promote
uncertainty as to the finality of foreclosure sales) and federal
law ("because potential buyers will discount their assessment
of the true market value of the property to reflect this uncer7
tainty").4
The court of appeals engaged in the kind of critical pragmatic interpretation that is both more typical of courts and
more useful for courts than is Justice Scalia's formalism. Although acknowledging a strong formalist argument to the contrary, the court of appeals found that this argument was outweighed by pragmatic and functional factors. Note that these
were not merely considerations that the judges dreamed up,
but factors that resonate well in the web of beliefs of the
American legal community. Promoting the finality of property
transactions, encouraging full bidding at foreclosure sales to
obtain as much equity as possible for creditors, avoiding burying bankruptcy courts in endless litigation about valuation, and
avoiding federal law deviating from state law on such sensitive
issues are all factors well within the purview of judicial analysis. None seems idiosyncratic or unduly personal or ideological.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 1148.

44. See id.
45. Id.

46. See id. at 1148-49.
47. Id.
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In short, they are legal-process values that any Americantrained lawyer should understand are relevant in our legal system.
To be sure, this does not ensure that this outcome is
"right." "Right" here means the best accommodation of formalist and antiformalist factors, not, as for Justice Scalia, the
"right" solution to a word puzzle. For example, it may be that a
plain-language interpretation would have actually fostered
greater equity for creditors without unduly burdening the
bankruptcy courts and without unduly disconnecting state and
federal law. It is precisely a debate of this type that critical
pragmatic interpretation seeks to foster.
By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. 48 The dissenting opinion chastised the majority for failing to follow the plain meaning of the statute. 49 Oddly, the
majority opinion was written by Justice Scalia; the dissent was
by Justice Souter. Recall that under the statute, the trustee
may avoid the transaction if the debtor received "less than a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer."50
To understand it the way Scalia did-to equate this text with
whatever is provided by state fraudulent conveyance law,
which varies in its details from state to state-seems a big
stretch. Recall that the court of appeals acknowledged that the
courts disagreeing with it (and with Justice Scalia) had the
51
"plain meaning" argument on their side.
Moreover, even if this language might be viewed as not one
hundred percent unambiguous, that is not the key under
Scalia's self-announced test. Recall his formulation: "first, find
the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context;
and second, using established canons of construction, ask
whether there is any clear indication that some permissible
meaning other than the ordinary one applies." 52 The first part
of the test is not the old "plain meaning rule," a familiar notion
to lawyers that if the statute has a plain meaning-is unambiguous-the court must stick with that meaning, but if the statute is ambiguous, the court is free to consult the legislative his48. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
49. See id. at 549-55 (Souter, J., joined by Blackmun, Stevens & Ginsburg,
JJ., dissenting).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1994).
51. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
52. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
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tory, statutory purposes, and other potential sources of meaning.5 3 Instead, Justice Scalia has proposed an ordinarymeaning rule. Whereas the old plain-meaning rule meant, in
essence, that the court had to stick to apparent textual meaning only in circumstances where, say, the meaning was 90/10
one direction, it would seem to be enough under the ordinarymeaning approach that the meaning is 60/40, or even 55/45, in
one direction to bind the court to that meaning, at least absent
an "established canon" pointing in another direction. For Justice Scalia, ambiguity is ordinarily not the key-and yet it became the key to liberate him from the apparent meaning of the
key statutory words in the BFP case. How are lower courts and
practitioners to divine when "ambiguity" is a safety valve liberating judges and when ordinary meaning is binding?
The more candid move in Justice Scalia's opinion in BFP
was canonical, not textual. Recall that the second part of his
method asks whether the ordinary meaning of statutory text
runs afoul of any established canon of statutory interpretation.54 What Justice Scalia did in BFP was inconsistent with
this piece of his announced approach as well, for he expanded a
new canon of statutory interpretation to bend the result in his
direction. Three years before BFP, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the
Court had created a clear statement rule providing that, when
Congress uses its power to regulate commerce in a fashion that
may regulate the state governments, the statute will not be
read as intruding upon core state functions unless it contains
unmistakably clear text to that effect. 55 Justice Scalia took this
brand new canon, which itself applied only to protect state governments from arguably officious federal intermeddling, and
seemingly modified it in BFP to apply to federal preemption of
core aspects of the local police power regulating private citizens, such as the state property laws. 56 Because neither the
Gregory canon nor its BFP offspring was an "established"
canon, it is inescapable that the creation of both canons was judicial lawmaking by any other name. BFP's reliance on Gregory was a great surprise-the Ninth Circuit below had not anticipated the idea, and Gregory was not even cited in any of the
briefs in the Supreme Court.

53.
54.
55.
56.

See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
See supra notes 33, 52 and accompanying text.
501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991).
See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 554 & n.8 (1994).
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If the promise of the new textualism-the text, the whole
text, and nothing but the text-is that courts will stick with ordinary statutory meaning and leave the policy problems to the
Congress, then BFP flunks. If the promise of the new formalism-text plus established canons-is the creation of a mechanical, predictable interpretive regime, then BFP flunks as
well. The creation of new canons and the manipulation of old
ones provide the formalist with a safety valve-a device for
avoiding textual readings that she cannot abide. When this
proclivity to make law through canonical technique is combined
with the neat trick of selectively relying upon some ambiguity
to free the court to consider other factors, one must wonder
whether the new formalism is, in practice, very formalistic at
all.
Let's take one more example of tension between a court of
appeals and the Supreme Court. Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196457 outlaws discrimination in employment on the basis of such factors as race or gender. 58 Suppose an employee is
fired and, believing that the discharge was racially motivated,
files a complaint with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the first step in bringing a Title VII action.
Suppose further that, while the charge is pending, the former
employee seeks another job. If the former employer gives the
former employee a negative job reference in retaliation for his
or her filing of the complaint with the EEOC, is that actionable
under Title VII?
Title VIrs anti-retaliation provision states that it is unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment" who have availed themselves
of the statute's protections. 59 In my hypothetical situation, the
former employee is not an "employee" at the time the retaliation allegedly occurred. Nor could he possibly be considered an
"applicant for employment" to his former employer. On the
face of the statute, Title VII does not protect him. But that is
just stupid. "Retaliation" is exactly what the former employer
has done, and the former employer's conduct is precisely that
which the statute was designed to prevent.

57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
.58. See id. § 2000e-2.

59. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
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A case of this kind, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,60 divided the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sitting en
banc. Seven judges followed the plain meaning and denied relief; four dissented. The majority concluded that the statute
unambiguously failed to protect former employees from retaliation.6 1 Indeed, the statute defines "employee" as "an individual
employed by an employer,"62 and there was no doubt that, at
the time of the alleged retaliation, this person was not employed by that employer. The majority said that they were
"simply prohibited from reading into the clear language of the
63
definition of 'employee' that which Congress did not include."
The majority acknowledged that most of the courts of appeals
had gone the other way on this question, avoiding a literal interpretation because that produced a result defeating the underlying purposes of Title VII.6 This purposive approachconsistent with the critical pragmatism I endorsed earliercame under heavy fire from the Fourth Circuit majority, which
called it an abandonment of "the established analytical
framework for statutory construction" in pursuit of a reliance
"on broad considerations of policy."65 The majority stated that
"these decisions fail to heed the Supreme Court's repeated
mandate" to follow ordinary statutory textual meaning, citing a
Supreme Court opinion written by Justice Thomas that is very
Scalia-like in its analysis. 66 The majority concluded that,
"[alithough extending Title VII to cover former employees is
tantalizing fruit, our judicial inquiry must cease when the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous. Such is the
rule of law."67
When the Supreme Court granted review in Robinson, I
was delighted. Now was the time to find out if there are five or
more pragmatists left on the Court. If so, it seemed that Justice Scalia would have fun in his dissent, chiding them along
the lines of "such is the rule of law."

60. 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev'd, 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
61. See id. at 329-30.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ef).
63. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 330.
64. See id. at 331-32.
65. Id. at 332.
66. Id. (citing Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254
(1992)).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
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I was quite surprised when the Supreme Court reversed
unanimously-in an opinion by Justice Thomas! 68 You have to
wonder if the judges in the majority of the Fourth Circuit felt
that they had been victimized by a bait and switch. Justice
Thomas concluded that "employee" was ambiguous in Title
VII-it could mean former employees as well as current ones. 69
After all, the definition of an employee is someone "employed
by an employer,"7 0 which could be "is employed" or "was employed," Justice Thomas wrote, and without a verb derived
from the infinitive "to be" preceding the verb "employed," the
statute is ambiguous. 7 1 Some provisions of Title VII seem to
assume that "employee" means former employees, while others
do not. 72 This broader statutory context, along with "a primary
purpose of [the] antiretaliation provisions: [m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms," 7 3 supported an
interpretation protecting former employees as well as current
employees and applicants for employment.
I entirely agree with the outcome in this case, as well as
with much of its rationale. To get to this outcome, however,
Justice Thomas had to posit that the Court was free to roam
around the rest of the statute and consider broad statutory
purposes, so long as the provision in question did not have a
strictly unambiguous meaning. Again, the limiting device proposed by Justice Scalia-courts must stick to "ordinary meaning" even when there is no plain meaning-failed to work itself
into a Supreme Court opinion that Justice Scalia himself
joined. In this light, even if the majority of the Fourth Circuit
was wrong to conclude that the definition of "employee" was
completely unambiguous, were they not right that the definition had an ordinary meaning excluding former employees?
Justice Thomas worked hard to create enough doubt on the
question of ambiguity to allow him to peek outside the provision at broader considerations. At that point, the case became
an exercise in pragmatism, and an easy one at that.
Robinson suggests that, like beauty, ambiguity is in the
eye of the beholder. In Robinson ambiguity becomes a magi-

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
See id. at 340-45.
Id. at 342 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994)).
Id. (emphases in original).
See id. at 343.
Id. at 346.
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cally liberating factor, a beautiful thing for judges-even if, or
one might say, especially if, it is selectively employed.
What might courts of appeals judges make of BFP and
Robinson? I have some suggestions. When "broader considerations" counsel a deviation from plain statutory language, as the
Ninth Circuit thought in BFP, do not write the opinion in antiformalist fashion, balancing textual, institutional, and contextual factors to reach a pragmatic result. No, you will be accused of abusing the judicial role.
Instead, reach your
pragmatic result by the formalist path of enveloping those
broader considerations into a new canon of interpretation (or
better yet, reformulate an existing canon to suit your needs, so
it looks even less like you are lawmaking into the teeth of
statutory text). When you do that, cite BFP and its predecessor, Gregory v. Ashcroft, in support. If you have problems with
plain statutory text that canonical manipulation cannot somehow solve, find some way that the text is not one hundred percent unambiguous-to paraphrase an old hair tonic commercial, just a little doubt will do ya-to free up your license to rely
on broad statutory purposes. When you do this, cite Robinson
in support.
More seriously, is there really any doubt that the results in
both BFP and Robinson are driven by antiformalist considerations? Would it not be appropriate to promote more judicial
candor in acknowledging that, rather than hiding behind canons of interpretation and artificial exercises in ambiguityhunting? I think the judges on the courts of appeals might appreciate this, for it might eliminate more bait and switch jobs,
like Robinson, in the future.
Even if the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court are
not in synch on these issues of interpretation, one would hope
that the Court's recent increased focus on formalist methodology at least would create some greater consistency in the
Court's own work. One would expect the greatest consistency
in related cases concerning the same statute. It has not always
worked out that way, however, as in three related criminal
cases that, in the interests of brevity, I will analyze quickly.
A federal statute provides that "[wihoever, during and in
relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime...
uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be
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sentenced to imprisonment for five years... ."74 The magic
language here is "uses or carries a firearm." Suppose someone
trades a gun for some drugs. Does that trigger the five-year
mandatory sentence on top of the sentence for the drug offense?
Yes, the Court said in the first of these cases, in an opinion by
Justice O'Connor. 75 Trading the gun for drugs was certainly
"using" the gun in relation to a drug offense, she said, citing
dictionary definitions defining "use" as "to employ. 7 6 Justice
Scalia dissented, contending that the ordinary meaning of
"uses a firearm" is using a gun as a gun, not as a medium of ex77
change like money.
What if both a gun and drugs are found in a vehicleshould the defendant receive the mandatory sentence on top of
the drug sentence? In the second case, which dealt with this
situation, the Court unanimously rejected the argument that
the defendant had "used" the gun.7 Justice O'Connor wrote
that the statute required an active use-I guess, like trading
the gun for drugs-rather than the passive employment of the
gun in this circumstance. 79 But in a third case essentially
identical in facts to the second case, a bare majority of the
the gun had been
Court accepted a different theory, 8that
"carried" in relation to a drug offense. 0 Recall that the statute
provided the extra penalty for someone who "uses or carries a
firearm" in relation to the drug offense. 8' The majority opinion
by Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Thomas; the dissenting opinion by Justice
Ginsburg was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia,
and Justice Souter. This is a weird and, so far as I know,
unprecedented lineup of Justices on both sides of a question.
Justice Breyer, who is not much of a formalist, began the
substantive part of his opinion with hyperformalism, stressing
dictionary definitions of "carry" as simply meaning conveying
something, and to this effect he also marshaled quotations from
the Bible, Defoe's Robinson Crusoe, Melville's Moby Dick, and

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994).
See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
Id. at 229.
Id. at 241-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
See id. at 142-50.
See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994).
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numerous newspaper articles. 82
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In dissent, Justice Ginsburg

contended that "carrying a gun" means "bearing [it] in such

manner as to be ready for use as a weapon[]"8 3 or, more collo-

quially, "pack[ing] heat,"84 not putting it in the trunk of your
car. She responded to Justice Breyer by citing her own dictionary definitions and biblical passages for this narrower definition of "carry" as meaning carrying an object in one's hand or
on one's person.8 5 She also counter-punched from the literary
perspective-quoting poetry from Oliver Goldsmith and Rudyard Kipling 6-the political perspective-recalling Teddy Roosevelt's famous advice to speak softly and carry a big stick 87 and the popular-entertainment perspective-quoting Benjamin
Franklin (Hawkeye) Pierce, played by Alan Alda on the popular
television series M*A*S*H, as follows:
I will not carry a gun.... I'll carry your books, I'll carry a torch, I'll
carry a tune, I'll carry on, carry over, carry forward, Cary Grant, cash
and carry, carry me back to Old Virginia, I'll even "hari-kari" if you
show me how, but I will not carry a gun!8"

Again, Justice Scalia, who joined Justice Ginsburg's dissent, stuck to his view that the ordinary meaning of the key
statutory term was narrow enough to allow the criminal defendant to escape liability. I applaud this sensible interpretation,
especially in light of the longstanding canon of statutory interpretation counseling that ambiguities in criminal statutes are
construed in favor of the defendant.8 9 My agreement is largely
82. See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 127-32.
83. Id. at 140 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Souter,
JJ., dissenting).
84. Id. at 145 (quoting United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704, 707 (9th Cir.
1998) (en banc), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 32 (1998) (mem.)).
85. See id. at 143.
86. See id. at 143-44.
87. See id. at 144.
88. Id. at 144 n.6 (omissions in original) (relying on an internet web site).
She also quoted Charles Bronson's character in the film The Magnificent
Seven in the same footnote. See id.
89. The majority and dissenting opinions in Muscarello provide excellent
examples of the manipulability of this canon. For the majority, Justice Breyer
after
articulated an exceedingly narrow rule of lenity that is triggered "only if,
seizing everything from which aid can be derived ....we can make no more
than a guess as to what Congress intended." Id. at 138 (multiple quotation
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997)).
Unsurprisingly, Justice Ginsburg's dissent asserted a more aggressive formulation of the rule of lenity, contending that "where text, structure, and history
fail to establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct-we
apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant's] favor."
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based on the proposition that the language of the statute is not
very clear and that the policy bases for the canon of narrow
construction--ensuring fair notice to criminal defendants, limiting prosecutorial discretion, limiting the reach of the federal
criminal law over what are also state crimes-strike me as legitimate legal-process concerns of pragmatic importance in this
context. It certainly seems more useful than artificial searches
for objective meaning by rooting around in dictionaries,
Bartlett's FamiliarQuotations,and on-line newspaper sources.
If the Court cannot achieve coherence in a line of cases involving the same statute, it is even less likely to attain coherence across a field of law over time. In this respect, because of
time constraints, I will only briefly mention the field I study
the most-federal Indian law. 90 A series of cases had suggested
that Indian tribal sovereignty survives to this day and can be
abrogated only by a clear congressional command. This approach attempted to make Congress take colonization seriously. It was designed to serve the values of predictability, certainty, and limiting judicial discretion, which are central to
Justice Scalia's formalism.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has seemingly replaced
this approach with an ad hoc balancing test, under which tribal
assertions of sovereignty are measured against whatever other
interests might be present in the case. We need not merely
speculate that this is a kind of legal dynamism that Justice
Scalia would condemn. The collected papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, available at the Library of Congress, demonstrate that Justice Scalia has concerns about this evolution of
legal doctrine in an antiformalist direction. 91 In a 1990 case in
Id. at 148 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Granderson, 511
U.S. 39, 54 (1994)). That both Justices could find such diverse quotations

from precedent on the effect of the rule of lenity suggests that the Court has
no consistent approach to resolving criminal liability under less than certain
statutory provisions. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345.

90. Here I borrow from my analysis in Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law
for Our Age of Colonialism:The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Author-

ity over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. (forthcoming Oct. 1999).
91. See Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. (Apr. 4, 1990) (Duro v. Reina, No. 88-6546), in The Papers of
Thurgood Marshall (reproduced from the collections of the Library of Congress, on file with author). I thank David Getches for a copy of this memorandum, which he discussed in David H. Getches, Conqueringthe Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1573, 1575 (1996).
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which the majority voted that a tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember even though Congress had never abrogated it,92 apparently Justice Scalia originally expressed an inclination to go along with the dissenting views of Justices
Brennan and Marshall. Brennan assigned Scalia the dissenting opinion. After working on it for awhile, Scalia finally gave
up and switched sides. In a short memorandum to Brennan
apologizing for doing this, Scalia said the recent "opinions in
this field have not posited an original state of affairs that can
subsequently be altered only by explicit legislation, but have
rather sought to discern what the current state of affairs ought
to be by taking into account all legislation, and the congressional 'expectations' that it reflects, down to the present day."93
Justice Scalia explained that "I would not have taken that approach as an original matter, but it seems too deeply imbedded
in our jurisprudence to be changed at this stage."94
This is a remarkable admission of deference to the antiformalist jurisprudential status quo for a Justice who continues
to refuse to join any majority opinion that even cites legislative
history, 95 now almost a decade after a majority opinion stating
that the majority would continue to rely on legislative history if
it darned well wanted to, thank you very much. 96 It lends itself
to the hypothesis that some things are worth fighting about,
like the use of legislative history, and others are not, like the
continuation of meaningful Indian tribal sovereignty.
The examples that I have given suggest that, as a descriptive matter, the Supreme Court continues to consider antiformalist as well as formalist factors in interpreting statutes, and
that as a normative matter, the appropriate criticism is not to
condemn the pragmatic exercise in the name of formalism (Justice Scalia's preferred critique), but instead to insist upon a
critical pragmatism that candidly exposes what the court is
97
doing and why it is doing it.
For example, my concern about
the Court's recent drift in federal Indian law is not that it con92. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684-92 (1990).
93. Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., supra note 91 (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
96. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991)
(positing that the Court's well-established practice of using legislative history
in statutory construction "will... reach well into the future").
97. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 199-204 (1994); Eskridge, supra note 37, at 1556-60.
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siders antiformalist factors, but that it has done so in a onesided way that lacks candor about what it is up to and why it is
doing it. 98 That kind of uncritical pragmatism is just as bad, in
its own way, as hyperformalism. The uncritical pragmatist
privileges a limited, even biased perception of life to the exclusion of meaning derived from formal legal sources and from a
more nuanced appreciation of the complexities of life in a diverse, pluralistic society. The hyperformalist defers to a frequently artificially determinate formal legal meaning without
critically testing it against the broader purposes of a legal regime, which are to foster a functioning society. 99
The debate between formalism and antiformalism lies at
the root of American jurisprudence. Judge Posner has written:
[This] jurisprudential disagreement is not less important by virtue of
being unavowed by most judges. It is the disagreement between the
severely positivistic view that the content of law is exhausted in clear,
explicit, and definite enactments by or under express delegation from
legislatures, and the natural lawyer's or legal pragmatist's view that
the practice of interpretation and the general terms of the Constitution (such as "equal protection of the laws") authorize judges to enrich
positive law with the moral values and practical concerns of civilized
society.... Neither approach is entirely satisfactory. The first buys
political neutrality and a type of objectivity at the price of substantive
injustice, while the second buys justice in the individual case at the
price of considerable uncertainty and, not infrequently, judicial willfulness. It is no wonder that our legal system oscillates between the
approaches} °°

It is our quest to live in a just society under the rule of law
that causes these oscillations. My view is that no sharp disjunction can be legislated between law and life, between judge
and context, between neutrality and value. Law without life is
no more functional to a thriving society than would be life
without law.
I can think of no more fitting way to end this lecture than
to suggest that the two outstanding lecturers I identified at the
outset would join me on the pragmatic side of this debate. Emerson was a bit of a political reformer, while Younger was more
concerned with preserving the beauty of what existed, but both
98. See Frickey, supranote 90.
99. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.

SACKS,

THE LEGAL

PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 102

(William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
100. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1334-35 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (Posner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), af/d sub nom. Chapman v.
United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
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would have laughed, I think, at the notion that formalist rules
can, much less should, purge considerations of life from our
thought processes.
Emerson was asked to address the graduating class of the
Harvard Divinity School in 1838.101 At a time when the Harvard Divinity School was still very much concerned with traditional notions of divinity, he chose a subversive theme for the
lecture. He contrasted historical religion, which he castigated
as a dead body of formalisms, with living religion, which he
viewed as seeking to uncover truths revealed through the experiences of life. He stated:
Whenever the pulpit is usurped by a formalist, then is the worshipper defrauded and disconsolate.... I once heard a preacher who
sorely tempted me to say, I would go to church no more.... A snowstorm was falling around us. The snowstorm was real; the preacher
merely spectral; and the eye felt the sad contrast in looking at him,
and then out of the window behind him, into the beautiful meteor of
the snow. He had lived in vain. He had no one word intimating that
he had laughed or wept, was married or in love, had been commended, or cheated, or chagrined. If he had ever lived and acted, we
were none the wiser for it. The capital secret of his profession,
namely, to convert life into truth, he had not learned. Not one fact in
all his experience, had he yet imported into his doctrine. This man
had ploughed, and planted, and talked, and bought, and sold; he had
read books; he had eaten and drunken; his head aches; his heart
throbs; he smiles and suffers; yet was there not a surmise, a hint, in
all the discourse, that he had ever lived at all. Not a line did he draw
out of real history. The true preacher can be known by this, that he
deals out to the people his life,-life passed through the fire of
thought. But of the bad preacher, it could not be told from his sermon, what age of the world he fell in; whether he had a father or a
child; whether he was a freeholder or a pauper; whether he was a
citizen or a countryman; or any other fact of his biography.
It seemed strange that the people should come to church. It
seemed as if their houses were very unentertaining, that they should
prefer this thoughtless clamor.'0 2

It is a tribute to the power of formalism that Emerson was immediately condemned for this lecture and was not invited back
to Harvard for over thirty years.
Compare Younger's advice on the importance of bringing
life to legal writing:

101. See Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Divinity School Address, in 1 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 71, 72 (Alfred R. Ferguson et
al. eds., 1971).
102. Id. at 85-86 (emphasis added).
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You must see through and around your subject, measuring it by more
than one measuring stick, turning it over, testing it, arriving at a just
and clear-headed assessment of its position in the hierarchy of things.
The word that best expresses this requisite distance is "detachment," understood as a certain amusement with the enterprise upon
which you are engaged, a sense of humor about yourself and your
works. If a lawyer has it, the lawyer's writing will unfailingly communicate the play of intelligence ("play" here being as important as
"intelligence"). 0 3

Younger urged lawyers and judges to assess issues through
multiple lenses for their position in the hierarchy of the multiplicity of things, not just as against one big thing-a quintessentially pragmatic technique. The Emersonian preacher's
task is to speak of life passed through the fire of thought; the
gifted legal analyst, Younger suggested, brings the fire of
thought to law fused with life.
It is a shame that the students in this law school will never
have the privilege of learning from Irving Younger. Among his
many legacies, the one I wish to leave you with is this: strive
for the play of intelligence, with "play" being as important as
"intelligence." If you do this, Irving would be proud. Bring the
play of intelligence to the project of statutory interpretation. If
you do that, I will be proud, for it will reveal that our law
school has succeeded in conveying to you the practical significance of revisiting the revival of theory in statutory interpretation.

103. Irving Younger, Let's Get Serious,A.B.A. J., May 1, 1987, at 110.

